In the framework of rapid changes in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy
Megi Benia, Georgia
Edited by Giorgi Lomtadze
Introduction
The Middle East region is one
of the most sensitive areas in international politics nowadays.
International Community faces several security challenges here, such as -
terrorism, failed states, political or ethnic conflicts, separatism, nuclear
weapons or states’ self-determination.
The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), as one of the most successful military alliances, is
represented in the region with its own security policy. From apolitical
perspective it has been represented here by one of its strongest
members - Turkey for decades. Despite this fact, there are some changes in
official Ankara’s foreign and security policy, which can affect
organization’s presence in the region.
Despite NATO being ineffective
in this sense, I would argue that reality is different. Normally, we tend to
see changes as something very radical and increasing, but it can be the
opposite as well; and when something changes in a decreasing sense it stays
unnoticed. I am aiming to find shifts in NATO's policy towards the Middle East
and their causes. This article tries to demonstrate, that NATO has changed its
policy in the Middle East since 2011 in terms of being less active in security
issues of the region and the main reason for this was transformation in
Turkey’s foreign policy after Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s third term in office as
the prime minister of the country.
The main focus of this
research will be the period from 2011 to November 2015, within the framework of
comparison with another period from the end of Cold War till 2011.
What is the Middle East
Region?
What is the
Middle East Region?
In order to analyze the
policies of two international actors in one region and speak about changes
there, it is vital to define the borders of this region, because from different
perspectives one region can be defined differently.
In this article I will try to
speak about developments in the Middle East region or MENA or Greater Middle
East (World Bank) as it is used by many academics, scholars as well as military
and other officials.
MENA region consists of two
sub-regions - North Africa and the Middle East. According to World Bank
definition, these countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine,
Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia. (World Bank)
NATO in the
Middle East 1991 – 2011
The current role of the North
Atlantic Alliance in the Middle East region consists of three main aspects:
NATO–Mediterranean Dialogue (with its various practical cooperative activities,
including operation ‘Active Endeavour’ that is mandated to inspect ships and
combat terrorist activities in the Mediterranean Sea); the newly launched ICI
to foster cooperation between NATO and Arab Gulf countries; and finally, NATO’s
supportive role towards select regional issues (mainly Darfur and Iraq). (Orfy
2011, 91)
After the end of Cold War,
North Atlantic Alliance mentioned the Middle East region for the first time in
the 1991 strategic concept as one of the threats and challenges [1]. At that
time, the reason of such assessment was the transformation of international
order, collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the
decision of the Alliance to change its nature and 1991 Gulf war. (NATO 1991)
From the 1994 Brussels Summit
to 9/11, NATO’s role was limited to ongoing security dialogue with some
Mediterranean countries[2]. (Orfy 2011, 91) This dialogue is known as the
Mediterranean Dialogue process and it aims to (NATO 2015):
-
contribute to regional security and stability
-
achieve better mutual understanding
-
dispel
any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries
The emergence of a new global
era of countering international terrorism, following the 11 September attacks,
has fundamentally changed the primary threats to international security
assessment and redefined the concept of security for all states, although in
different ways. Consequently, successive post-9/11 NATO summits have underlined
the imperative of enhancing the role of the Alliance in the Middle East region.
Translating this will into action, the Alliance embarked on a series of actions
with regards to its Middle Eastern policy. Given the fact that more than 20
countries border the Mediterranean Sea, and perhaps around eight more have
close connections with it, and have contributed in one way or another to its
complexity, diversity, sensitivities and circumstances, the need to develop a
new formula was,therefore, vital for a wider and in-depth cooperation,
especially to cope with the requirements of Western policies in the post-9/11
era. (Orfy 2011, 110)
The basic features of NATO’s
policy towards the region in the post-9/11 years were drawn in the successive
summits – i.e. the 2002 Prague Summit, the 2004 Istanbul Summit and the 2006
Riga Summit. (Orfy 2011, 110)
The milestone of the evolution
of the NATO–Middle East relationship was the 2004 Istanbul Summit, in which the
allies showed resolute determination to address, in a unified manner, the
dangers stemming from the South. In this summit, the allies invited, in
Paragraph 36[3] with aim (Orfy 2011, 111)
“To
contribute towards regional security and stability through stronger practical
cooperation, including by enhancing the existing political dialogue, achieving
interoperability, developing defence reform and contributing to fight against
terrorism.” (NATO 2004)
Thus, the summit decided to
move in two parallel and intertwined directions: first, to upgrade the
Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership; and second, to launch the ICI
with the aim of reaching out to, and fostering cooperation with, select
countries in the region of ‘the Broader Middle East’. (Orfy 2011, 111)
To sum up, NATO’s policy can
be described in the region as “partnership based on cooperation” that was
mentioned in 2010 Alliance Security Concept as well. (NATO 2010)
Turkey’s
policy in the Middle East before 2011 through NATO membership
After the collapse of the
Soviet Union in the beginning of 90s, there were no major changes in Turkey’s
foreign and security policy since the establishment of the republic in 1921.
This policy called Traditional Turkish Policy, which has its origins in Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk’s legacy or so-called Kemalism. The main sources of the
traditional foreign policy of the Turkish Republic are the tradition of the
balance of power stemming from the times of Ottoman Empire, isolationism and
Sèvres syndrome[4] as direct legacy of WW1 and independence war, and policy of
Europeanization and modernization. (Šulík 2012)
According to so-called
Kemalism, Turkey did not participate in the issues of Muslim World and
especially on the territory of former Ottoman Empire including what we call
today the Middle East. Their policy concept was isolationism what
they used in regards to this region as well. If we remember the denial of
Turkish support for US Iraqi intervention, it is quite understandable that
Turkish inaction is in accordance with this concept. (Šulík 2012) In addition,
in the 21st century, during the first two terms of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as prime-minister,
Turkey had so-called policy of “zero problems with neighbors that was a natural
reflection of the “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” policy laid down by Great
Leader Ataturk. (MFA Turkey)
All this means that from the
end of the Cold War until 2011, Turkey did not try to play a role of Regional
Power actively and this policy had origins in the secularism of Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk.
Turkey had strong vision and
desire that they had to become part of Euro-Atlantic structures. Their policy
was characterized by strong secularism, which meant denying everything which
was connected to Islam and Ottoman Empire. Membership in NATO was vital for
official Ankara, because it was their security guarantor, while for NATO,
Turkey meant security of its southeastern border. (MFA Turkey 2011)
It is unquestionable that
policy of NATO and Turkey was undivided in the region and was represented in
one dimension.
Shifts in
Turkish policy since 2011 and NATO’s response
In 2011 Recep Tayyip Erdogan
started the third term in office as prime-minister of Turkey. One may ask
why this period should be identified as the counting point for showing changes
in Turkish policy. As James Stavridis mentioned in his article “the policy of
“zero problems with neighbors” is a pretty good approach — until all your
neighbors start to have problems, of course” (Stavridis 2015) and 2011 was
period when problems occurred in Turkey’s neighborhood.
As a response to these
developments, Turkey started implementation of New Turkish Policy.
According to the Turkish leadership, the region is of key importance for global
order. Therefore establishing itself as its patron would grant Turkey the
status of a global power. Turkish leadership is guided by a strong
belief in Turkey’s special mission as the successor of the Ottoman Empire and
at the same time a modern, powerful state, whose democratic government is an
emanation of not only a single nation’s will, but also the hitherto suppressed
historical and religious traditions of the entire region. Thus, as Turkey seeks
to become the patron of the Ottoman Empire’s former territories and, more
broadly, the entire Muslim world, this is not only a matter of security or the
economy, but also a historical mission. (Ananicz 2015, 24)
The peak of Turkey’s
involvement in the Middle East came with the advent of the Arab Spring. Ankara
saw the erosion of the old order and the popular uprisings as an opportunity to
transform the efforts it had hitherto made into real influence. It acted as the
advocate of the “Arab street” against the crumbling regimes and subsequently
supported the new governments in Tunisia, Egypt and initially in Libya. The Syrian
conflict turned out to be the greatest challenge. When protests first started
in Syria, Turkey tried to persuade Bashar al-Assad to implement democratic
reforms, and when those efforts failed, it started to actively support the
anti-Assad opposition and took other measures with a view to removing him from
power, incurring a huge political and social cost and placing its own security
at risk. (Ananicz 2015, 26)
All these facts show that
Turkey’s position has changed since Arab awaking radically. Now official Ankara
tries to be independent player in the region with its own policy. If years ago
NATO has no worries about this region, because it was represented by Turkey as
one of its strongest members here and consequently it meant that Turkey’s
policy was Alliance’s policy, now it does not seem so.
Many academics, scholars or
people who are interested in International Politics very often blame NATO in
its ignorance towards the Middle East region and especially for not responding
adequately to the shift in its vital member state’s policy in the region.
What we can see here is that
NATO softened its policy in the Middle East in the period from 2011 to 2015.
Alliance leaders pay attention to the importance of deterrence, partnership as
an effective policy implemented by organization and focusing on security-sector
reform, training and disarmament, mobilization and reintegration.(NATO 2013)
Taking into account the fact
that NATO mainly is a military organization, this policy was understood as
weakness of the alliance, but sometimes we forget that shift does not always
mean something radical. It is understandable that in such situations, the expected
answer to the developments in the region and especially to rapid changes in
policy of your member state is aggressive, but that did not happen .
The main reason for this, as
we can suggest, is Turkey’s position to make NATO involved in the regional
process for its own sake. For example, they demanded application of
organization’s Article 5[5] several times, especially during the Syrian events,
but NATO did not do this (Radio Liberty 2012). Turkish officials as well as
some academics are for Alliance’s active military involvement, which they
expect to use for their country’s own interest - independent policy towards the
Middle East region.
That is another question, if
such softening from NATO will be beneficial for the region, but it seems that in
such situations, when developments are critical, there is no time for extreme
actions.
Conclusion
Nowadays, regional
organizations always try to have common policy in many issues. Unfortunately,
we have only one example of this in face of the European Union.
NATO is one of the
strongest organizations in the International System today. In the very
sensitive region of Middle East, during the decades, it was represented by
Turkey, which has second largest army in the Alliance. Because of transformation
of Turkey into secular state and many other changes that was seen domestically
inside the country, it has clearly Western orientation. All this meant
that NATO has its own policy in the Middle East via official Ankara, but rapid
changes that have happened since 2011 changed some conditions.
The purpose of
this article was to identify the major factors which affected the shift in
NATO’s policy towards the Middle East since 2011. Research process revealed
that after the Arab awakening and shifts in Turkish foreign and security
policy, NATO softened its policy in the region and tries to continue the
strategy of partnership and deterrence. As it is seen, changes
occurred in Alliance’s policy, but not in radical or military way, as it was
expected. Most experts and scholars perceived this as a weakness of the
organization. However, this research showed that it was part of the new
strategy by the alliance, in order not to allow its member to play an
independent game, which it wishes to do.
Ananicz, Szymon. 2015. Alone in Virtue: The “New Turkish” Ideology in
Turkey’s Foreign Policy. Centre for Eastern Studies April
Orfy, Mohammed Moustafa. 2011. NATO and the Middle East: The
geopolitical context post-9/11. New York:
Routledge
Radio Liberty. 2012. NATO 'Stands' With Turkey But Does Not Invoke
Article 5 , 26 June
