Dmitri Trenin
Russia is learning to live in a
new harsh environment of U.S.-led economic sanctions and political
confrontation with the United States. More than five months after the change of
regime in Kiev, which ushered in a new era in Moscow's foreign policy and its
international relations, a rough outline of Russia's new security strategy is
emerging. It is designed for a long haul and will probably impact the global
scene.
The central assumption in that
strategy is that Russia is responding to U.S. policies that are meant to box it
in and hold it down—and back. The Kremlin absolutely could not ignore the
developments in Ukraine, a country of utmost importance to Russia. The armed
uprising in Kiev brought to power a coalition of ultranationalists and
pro-Western politicians: the worst possible combination Moscow could think of.
President Putin saw this as a challenge both to Russia's international position
and to its internal order.
Taking up the challenge,
however, meant a real and long-term conflict with the United States. Verbal
opposition to U.S. global hegemony was not enough. Unlike the 2008 Georgia war,
Ukraine was not an episode that could be safely localized and bracketed.
Essentially, the current U.S.-Russian struggle is about a new international
order.
For the foreseeable future,
Ukraine will remain the main battleground of that struggle. Moscow's tactics
can change, but its core interests will not. The main goal is to bar Ukraine
from NATO, and the U.S. military from Ukraine. Other goals include keeping the
Russian cultural identity of Ukraine's south and east, and keeping Crimea
Russian. In the very long run, the status of Crimea will be the emblem of the
outcome of the competition.
In broader terms, the
competition is not so much for Ukraine as for Europe and its direction. Unlike
at the start of the Cold War, with its pervasive and overriding fear of
communism, the present situation in Ukraine and the wider U.S. conflict with
Russia can be divisive. Western Europeans generally still see no threat from
Russia; they also depend on Russian energy supplies and on the Russian market
for their manufacturing exports.
Russia will seek to salvage as
much of its economic relationship with the EU countries as possible, especially
to retain some access to European technology and investment. It will also work
hard to protect the market for its energy supplies to Europe. In this effort,
Moscow will focus on Germany, Italy, France, Spain and a number of smaller
countries—from Finland to Austria to Greece—with which Russia has built
extensive trading relations.
Ideally, Russia would want to
see Europe winning back a measure of strategic independence from the United
States. Moscow may hope that the U.S.-led punishment of Russia, coming as it
does mainly at the expense of the EU's trade with it, can lead to Transatlantic
and intra-EU divisions. Yet, the Russians already feel that for the foreseeable
future Europe will follow the United States, even if at a distance. Thus, at
least in the short term, Russia will have to count with a more hostile Europe.
Longer-term Russian
calculations are linked with the steady emergence of Germany as a twenty-first
century great power and Europe's de-facto leader. This process, over time,
could give the EU the character of a genuine strategic player and make Europe's
relations with the United States more equitable. Even though Berlin's and
Moscow's interests differ significantly, and a stronger Germany may not
necessarily lead to an easy understanding with Russia, Russo-German relations
are a rising priority for the Kremlin.
This calculus however, is for
the distant future. For the present, Russia is seeking to compensate for the
losses in its Western trade and its standing vis-a-vis Europe and the United
States through a new outreach to Asia. China's importance to Russia rises, as
it is the one major economy impervious to U.S.-initiated sanctions. Concerned
at the same time with potentially becoming too dependent on its giant neighbor,
Russia will seek to engage others, such as Japan and South Korea, but, like in
Europe's case, those countries' relations with Russia will be constrained by
their alliances with the United States.
Given the fundamental nature of
Russia's conflict with the United States, Moscow is seeking to cement its connections
with non-Western countries. The BRICS group, which brings together Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa, is a natural platform for that. The
recent BRICS summit in Brazil made a first step toward creating common
financial institutions. Russia receives some moral support from its partners
and is working to improve relations with others in Latin America, Asia, the
Middle East and Africa. However, to really strengthen its ties with the
non-West, Russia will need to considerably expand economic relations with them:
a tall order. India is a key priority here, followed by ASEAN.
Politically, Russia already
posits itself as a go-to country for all those unhappy with U.S. global
dominance. These countries are watching Russia's confrontation with the United
States with keen interest, and are making conclusions for themselves. In
particular, they look at what a country like Russia can get away with, and what
cost it has to bear for that. Given the very diverse nature of the non-Western
world, which Russia has now fully joined, it is not realistic for Moscow to
expect too much solidarity from its partners there. Yet, the Russo-Chinese duo
at the UN Security Council could become a rallying point for those craving an
alternative to Western domination.
The Kremlin understands, of
course, that the most serious potential threats to Russian national security
come from within the country. In his recent remarks to the national security
council, President Putin ranged the Kremlin's priorities in the following
order: improving interethnic relations in the vast and very diverse country;
strengthening the constitutional order and political stability in Russia;
fostering economic and social development, with special attention to the
exposed, vulnerable or depressed regions of the Russian Federation. Any serious
problem in any of these areas, Putin is convinced, can be used by the United
States to undermine Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This list calls for more
government control of the domestic situation, a new economic policy to reindustrialize
Russia and reduce its dependence on the West in critical areas, careful
reallocation of resources to deal with weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and
winning more allies for the government in different groups of society. It also
calls for a more nationally conscious elite and patriotic upbringing of the
younger generation of Russians. To a degree, the Western pressure aids the
Kremlin's efforts.
In terms of military security,
the principal threats to Russia, in Putin's view, come from NATO military infrastructure
coming closer to Russia (almost a done deal now); from the U.S.
ballistic-missile defenses, which are seen as clearly directed at devaluing
Russia's nuclear deterrent; and from strategic nonnuclear systems that can
attack Russian targets with high precision. This calls for redoubling Russia's
own military modernization effort, with an emphasis both on the nuclear forces
which should remain a credible deterrent, and on the conventional forces which
can be employed in various scenarios on the perimeter of Russian borders and
abroad. The United States and NATO are back as likely adversaries.
The competition, skewed and
asymmetrical as it may be, is likely to be hard and long. The sanctions will
not make Putin back off. He also knows that if he were to step back, pressure
on him will only increase. The Russian elite may have to undergo a major
transformation, and a personnel turnover, as a result of growing isolation from
the West, but the Russian people at large are more likely to grow more patriotic
under outside pressure—especially if Putin leans harder on official corruption
and bureaucratic arbitrariness. If the Kremlin, however, turns the country into
a besieged fortress and introduces mass repression, it will definitely lose.
It is too early to speculate
how the contest might end. The stakes are very high. Any serious concession by
Putin will lead to him losing power in Russia, which will probably send the
country into a major turmoil, and any serious concession by the United
States—in terms of accommodating Russia—will mean a palpable reduction of U.S.
global influence, with consequences to follow in Asia, the Middle East and
elsewhere. Ironically, the challenge to the world's currently predominant power
does not come from the present runner-up, but from a former contender, long
thought to be virtually defunct. China could not have hoped for such a helping
hand.
Dmitri Trenin is the Director
of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Follow him on Twitter: @DmitriTrenin.
Комментариев нет:
Отправить комментарий