By Martin Chulov
The last leg of the journey to
jihad starts on goat trails near the Turkish-Syria border and ends through one
of many holes in a barbed wire fence stretching several hundred miles.
Just beyond, in some cases no
more than several kilometres away, new recruits are received by extremist
leaders waiting in boot camps in towns, villages and abandoned Syrian regime
buildings.
There the indoctrination
begins. Most who make the journey to Syria are already committed to the
hardline worldview. And after 30 days of Islamic study, weapons training and
frugal living, they are locked in to a lifestyle that few ever rescind.
"It was tough and
uncompromising," said one man who spent time in a camp within sight of the
Turkish border town of Kilis. "The trainers were Saudis and Yemenis. The
trainees were from everywhere. I saw two blue-eyed Frenchmen and a Belgian and
many from north Africa."
It has been this way in
northern Syria since mid-2012 when foreign fighters from around the world
started to descend on the country, about 18 months into the civil war.
The jihadis' entry was at first
low key, almost polite. They would share planes and buses with tourists
travelling to southern Turkey and pay local smugglers to get them to rendezvous
points that had been relayed by those who had made it safely inside.
The trails get busier after
dark. From June 2012, up to 40 men and boys were crossing each night from the
Turkish town of Reyhanli alone.
"They were standing
outside my property like cattle," a Turkish smuggler near the Syrian
border town of Atmeh, who says he helped the jihadis cross for free, told the
Guardian. "They would come every day for many months that year."
Within months, the extremists
had organised into disciplined and structured cells, their growth enhanced by
their benign approach to locals and their willingness, initially, to help
Syrian rebel groups.
"We knew they were foxing,
but what could we do?" said a leader of the town of al-Bab north-east of
Aleppo, who was ousted along with his entire company of rebels earlier this
year. From exile in Turkey, he added: "As the weeks continued they started
to get more inflexible, more demanding, and then just ruthless. They gained
power quicker than we thought."
In late April 2013, the Trojan
horse act was realised, and what is now known as Islamic State (Isis) was born.
The group had gathered such numbers and momentum that it was able to oust the
local al-Qaida group.
Its rapid advance ever since
has been abetted by a loose but effective military command structure, a
logistics operation that depends heavily on co-opting locals for food and
accommodation, and a fierceness in battle that has been developed by years of
conflict in Syria and Iraq and which, for newer recruits, is almost instantly
contagious.
"The only thing like it in
terms of spread and potency was the Nazi party in the late 30s," a senior
western diplomat said recently. "We are now dealing with a
juggernaut."
At the head of Isis is Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, the self-declared caliph. Baghdadi sits atop a military council
that sets strategy and manages resources from the eastern edge of Aleppo
through to north-western and central Iraq.
His commanders are almost all
Iraqi, and many are alumni of the two US prisons in Iraq, Camp Bucca and Camp
Cropper, which were closed in 2010. Beneath them are several dozen cadres who
carry no rank, but have a vaunted reputation from their time on the
battlefields of Iraq, both against US forces and Shia militias, and civilians.
These battle-hardened
ideologues, according to one member of the organisation, give Isis a resilience
that trickles down to the new foreign recruits, many of whom had not used a
weapon before arriving in Syria.
"The intensity of their
operations is extreme," the former Isis member said. "Sometimes they
are fighting for weeks on end. They were boys then, but they are not now."
He said the intensity of the
fighting had reduced the need for training camps. Some newcomers were thrown
straight into battle, learning on the move.
Others were drafted into
sourcing supplies, or working at the business end of Isis, smuggling oil and
antiquities and what is left of Syria's state-owned enterprises.
"They don't have a central
system for food or accommodation," he said. "They are all handled
locally. But all ammunition requests are dealt with centrally.
"The leadership is central
to most things. They have a very tight grip on Isis. No one is prepared to defy
them."
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