Why do international peacebuilding efforts often fail in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and the Central African Republic? Séverine Autesserre’s work in the DRC suggests that a variety of factors explain these disappointments, including peacebuilders’ failures to engage in local peace building. In her new book, Peaceland, Autesserre argues that the everyday habits of peacebuilders matter as well. I sat down with Autesserre for a Q&A about her findings.
By Laura Seay
Q: The
central argument of Peaceland is that international peacebuilders can undermine
their own peace building efforts because they live lives that are largely
separated from the populations they are trying to help. In my experience, most
aid workers, diplomats, and peacekeepers in places like Democratic Republic of
Congo would love to interact with ordinary people more, but they’re prohibited
from doing so due to security concerns. How do we strike an appropriate,
practical balance between security & improved interaction between
populations and peace builders?
Autesserre: I would say that the central argument of Peaceland is that
international interveners’ everyday practices, habits, and narratives undermine
their own peacebuilding efforts. One of the many ways these everyday elements
preclude successful peacebuilding is by separating expatriates from the
populations they are trying to help. And security routines are certainly a
prime offender. But they are just one
among many others, such as the type of knowledge that is valued on the ground,
the means by which interveners advertise their projects, the way they ensure
their neutrality or impartiality, the kinds of results they look for, and so
on.
For
all of the everyday elements that I analyze in the book, I show that there is a
dominant way of acting – for instance, not interacting with ordinary people due
in part to security concerns – and exceptions – people who challenge the
dominant ways of acting and suggest alternate solutions. Take the example of
the security concerns that you mention: There are two main ways to protect your
safety in conflict zones. One is to isolate yourself from your surroundings and
live in a fortified compound, drive with doors locked and windows closed, and
limit your interactions with ordinary people – as do the aid workers,
diplomats, and peacekeepers that you mention. The other way is to use an
acceptance approach, meaning to keep a low profile, blend as much as possible
in the surrounding communities, and develop good relationships with local
people, including armed groups and power brokers. What’s really interesting is,
in many contexts, acceptance is more effective than isolation – see notably
Larissa Fast’s latest book and the 2011 report by Jan Egeland, Adele Harmer,
and Abby Stoddard. And using an acceptance approach to security does not have
the counterproductive consequence of separating interveners from the
populations that they want to help, rather the opposite.
Q: You argue that factors like with whom
peacebuilders have after-work drinks, where they dine, and who attends
expat-oriented parties actually affects the effectiveness of international
interventions. Could you explain for our readers how & why that is?
Autesserre: This is such an important example because so many
interveners see their social lives as separate from their work abroad – and
these types of practices go under the radar of policy-makers when considering
how to improve peacebuilding because, at first glance, it seems so trivial.
Yet, as we have already discussed, everyday practices create firm boundaries
between international peacebuilders and the populations whose cooperation they
need to implement their projects. Social habits – with whom you have after-work
drinks, parties, and dinners – can either reinforce these boundaries or break
them.
If
you only socialize with other expatriates, you end up living in an expatriate
bubble where you are disconnected from your surroundings and don’t understand
well enough the local realities that you want to change – so you can’t be very
effective. On the other hand, when you socialize with local people, you get a
better understanding of the country or village where you work, and that makes
you better at tailoring your programs to the problems at hand. You also have a
better chance at gaining acceptance into local communities, thus ensuring you
have better access to information to predict when tensions may be on the rise
and advocate for interventions to prevent violence. You get official approval
or cooperation for your programs much more easily than the other expatriates
who have no local contacts. You are perceived as more respectful by the
communities in which you work, and that diminishes their incentives to adapt,
distort, or reject your programs. You are better able to contribute to capacity
development because “relationship building” is essential to that. And so on and
so forth (I have an entire chapter on this topic in the book).
And,
of course, I’m not the only scholar who has made this observation. Anne Holohan
and Adam Moore (among others) have shown that the effectiveness of the same
international program varies widely depending on whether its implementers
socialize with their local counterparts.
This
would in fact seem like common sense to anybody who does not live in
“Peaceland” (the term I give to the international peacebuilders’ world). But
the habit of socializing only with other expats is currently so ingrained that
interveners rarely put this idea into practice – they do not even talk about
it.
Q:
Peaceland takes an innovative approach to studying peacekeeping and associated
peacebuilding interventions: ethnography. Why did you choose the ethnographic
approach?
Autesserre: I wanted to see whether everyday practices and habits had
any influence on peacebuilding effectiveness. The problem is that everyday
practices and habits are usually implicit, automatic, and taken for granted.
Vincent Pouliot has a fantastic sentence in “The Logic of Practicality” to
explain what it means in terms of research methodology: Asking people to
identify their everyday practices is usually about as productive as “asking
fish, if they could speak, to describe the water in which they swim.” In other
words, common political science methodologies like surveys, interviews, or
document analyses are great to study things that are explicit and deliberate,
but they don’t work well if you are trying to understand everyday practices.
What researchers need to do is to experience those practices and habits
personally. So I used participant and field observations to get at practices
and habits, and I complemented these methods with in-depth interviews and
document analysis to study policies, strategies, institutions, and narratives.
Q: What
does this approach contribute that’s missing from other International Relations
scholarship?
Autesserre: It helps complement the existing IR analyses that usually
focus on macro-level policies, strategies, institutions, and discourses. But,
despite the work of people like Charli Carpenter, Vincent Pouliot, Ed Schatz,
and Lisa Weeden, this approach remains quite rare in international relations
because it presents several complications for researchers. Its emphasis on
direct contact requires researchers to gain privileged access to organizations
that have a culture of secrecy, such as diplomatic missions or the United
Nations. It poses an additional challenge to scholars of war and peace, as it
requires us to spend extended periods of time in the dangerous environments
where intervention actually takes place – something that is often impossible
for academics due to security concerns, family imperatives, and teaching
obligations. As a result, we still don’t know enough about the influence of everyday
practices and habits in international relations.
Q: There have been many changes in peacebuilding
efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo over the last few years, in part
due to the influence of your first book, The Trouble with the Congo. What’s
working there in terms of peace building, and what needs to change?
Autesserre: A lot has changed over the past few years, but the overall
patterns that I analyzed in The Trouble With the Congo have remained the same.
Most international interveners still use a top-down approach to peacebuilding
and focus on initiatives like big international conferences and elite-level
peace processes.
There
is a bit more attention paid to local conflicts than before, and that’s
heartening. When I started my Ph.D. research in the early 2000s, donors,
diplomats, and United Nations peacekeepers usually did not understand what I
meant when I asked what they were doing to support local conflict resolution
(they would answer by telling me about their projects to treat victims of
sexual violence or provide humanitarian aid). When they did actually understand
my questions, they often started laughing at me, as if supporting local
conflict resolution was an absurd idea.
Now,
even the United Nations Special Envoy for the Great Lakes mentions local
conflict resolution as something that we should support. And there are more
funds and programs to support local peace building actors. The financial
investment is still very small compared to the needs, and the acknowledgements
by high-level officials often sound a lot like just paying lip service to the
idea, but we are on the right track, and that’s very good news for peace
building in Congo.
Q:
What’s next on your research agenda?
Autesserre: I am actually on my way to Congo to test two ideas for my
next project: one on the reasons for peacebuilding success and the other on the
production of knowledge on civil and international wars. Both ideas are very
much in line with what I have done in the past – a focus on on-the-ground
dynamics and an interpretive and ethnographic approach. It seems like the
scholarly world has done a pretty good job analyzing why peacebuilding doesn’t
work, but we still know so little about why and when it does work. To me, that
is the next step to improving international peace interventions.
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