By Stephen Blank
Iran is seeking to recapture lost ground in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Earlier signs that the nuclear issue might be moving towards a peaceful resolution has encouraged some of Iran’s neighbors to take preparatory steps to resume dialogue with Tehran. Iran has extensive ties with and influence in Afghanistan. Thus Iran’s vital interests are connected with the future of that country. As NATO winds down its presence there, the widespread concern about the future of Afghanistan may lead improved ties between Iran and Central Asian states who clearly want as many foreign governments as possible to exercise a moderating influence on Afghan developments.
BACKGROUND: Iran has for many
reasons failed to utilize its proximity to Central Asia for maximum gain since
1991. Certainly one of those reasons is its support for Islamic terrorist
groups, generally Shiite, whereas Central Asian governments regard all dissent
as extremism or terrorism and are Sunni except for Tajikistan. Perhaps even
more importantly, Iran’s nuclear program not only alarmed all members of the
SCO, the sanctions imposed by Washington and the constant diplomatic pressure
to isolate Iran has short-circuited any real possibility for both Iran and its
Central Asian neighbors to maximize potential trade and investment deals.
Yet President Rouhani’s
government has formulated a new regionalism concept whereby Iran will try to
augment its influence in neighboring regions like the Caucasus and Central
Asia. The new regionalism policy aims to overcome that setback to both sides’
potential for trade, investment, and mutual influence. And there are at least
some signs of increased Iranian capacity in this regard. The ongoing evolution
of some major infrastructural projects like China’s Silk Road and the obstacles
to others like the TAPI gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to India led to a reconsideration
of Iran’s eligibility to participate in the Silk Road or to an alternative gas
pipeline from Iran through Pakistan to India.
In August Iran announced that
it no longer needs gas imports from Turkmenistan as it is increasing domestic
production. This is not a negative move toward Turkmenistan but rather a change
in Iran’s capacity and domestic policy, evidenced by the fact that the so
called Ashgabat Agreement created a North-South corridor from Turkmenistan
through Uzbekistan to Iran and Oman is steadily moving forward. This railroad
and corridor should give a major boost to Central Asian countries’ efforts to
reach the Gulf and other markets. It should also connect to China’s Silk Road
and greatly increase the global interconnections of rail and other commercial
traffic for all the countries involved. Likewise, the
Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan railroad is scheduled to open in November. This
project will provide similar gains to all of its members in accessing hitherto
distant or relatively inaccessible markets and increasing a network of
interconnecting north-south and east-west rail lines and corridors where Iran
and its neighbors and partners stand to make very handsome gains.
Rouhani has tried to revive
relations with Russia and major oil and food deals that will benefit Iran by
getting it out of the sanctions regime and help Russia overcome its own
sanctions due to the war with Ukraine.
Iran is also seeking to improve
ties to Azerbaijan, which fell apart in 2012-2013 due to the uncovering of
several Iranian terrorist plots. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev made a
state visit to Iran and Rouhani said there was no obstacle to the expansion of
ties between them. Other Iranian officials have made similar declarations and
the summit has led to new agreements on trade and cooperation. The deterioration of U.S.-Azerbaijani
relations undoubtedly plays a role here as do Baku’s anxieties concerning
Moscow and its desire to create as many friendly relations with neighbors and
key regional actors as possible. Another factor may be the concern that if ties
between Tehran and Washington improve, Azerbaijan might be left out of key
energy, trade, and strategic decisions that would follow. Nevertheless it is
unclear just how much of a change this implies in the substance of Irano-Azeri
relations as Baku is hardly surrendering its ties to Israel and certainly wants
more support from Washington.
IMPLICATIONS: It is by no means
clear to what extent Iran’s campaign to improve its overall position in Central
Asia will succeed. Rouhani’s appearance at the annual summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization reaffirmed Iran’s quest for full membership in the
SCO. Since the SCO is likely to expand to include India and Pakistan as full
members by the 2015 summit, Iran will certainly push for that status too. Yet
Iran still cannot get into the SCO as the bylaws of that organization prohibit
its membership because of the sanctions that it continues to experience.
Moreover, nobody in Central Asia wants a nuclear Iran or gratuitous
provocations with Washington over that issue. Neither is it clear that the
issue of support for terrorism will simply disappear since Iran has hardly
disbanded its capabilities in this regard and as Sunni-Shiite suspicions are,
if anything, rising across the Islamic world.
Nevertheless, we should take
account of the tangible material developments that are occurring. China’s Silk
Road is materializing and former Russian programs for an independent
North-South corridor or network with a terminus in Iran or India will be
integrated into it over time. Iran may eventually realize its ambitions to
become a trade, energy, and economic hub but it must do so in conjunction with
a vast increase in Chinese economic power across the region. Central Asian
states too will benefit economically but it is unlikely that their smaller
networks, whose degree of connection to larger projects like the Silk Road has
yet to be decided, will be completely independent.
All of this is contingent upon
a resolution of the nuclear issue, which has hit a roadblock over enrichment
quotas. Iran’s recent demands for an industrial-size enrichment program will
not break the deadlock in negotiations and may set them back. Certainly such
demands do not alleviate neighbors and great powers’ suspicions concerning
Iran’s objective in this region or in the Middle East. Until this issue is
resolved, any effort to improve Iran’s relations with Central Asian states or
to maximize their economic interaction will fail, and Iran will continuously be
denied full membership in the SCO. Neither will its economy be able to serve as
an entrepot for Central Asian states in search of new markets.
Similarly Baku’s suspicions of
Iran’s goals, capabilities, and policies will not abate unless the issues of
terrorism and nuclear power are resolved. It is also unlikely that the littoral
States of the Caspian Sea will truly warm up to Iran absent a change in the
hitherto unyielding Iranian position regarding demarcation of the Caspian
Sea. On the other hand, should these
issues be resolved in a satisfactory way, it is quite clear that the West will
have a major interest in opening the Caspian Sea up to Iranian and Central
Asian energy trade to Europe to realize the visions of a Trans-Caspian pipeline
and a southern corridor given the vital importance of finding alternatives to
Russia’s predatory energy policies in Europe and Central Asia.
Given all the perturbations
occurring in world politics, it is clear that neither Iran nor Central Asia are
unaffected by those developments and trends.
But the extent to which Iran and Central Asian states (including
Azerbaijan) can forge more rewarding mutual ties still lies largely in Tehran’s
hands. It is by no means clear that Iran is ready to make a major policy shift
form the fruitless and unnecessarily antagonistic policies of the past to a
different and potentially more successful policy line in Central Eurasia.
CONCLUSIONS: There is little
reason to doubt that a different set of Iranian policies would evoke a positive
response in Central Asia since all those states would like to see as many
foreign partners as possible involved in, but not dominating, Central Asia.
Those policies too would be extremely beneficial to Iran economically and
geopolitically. Not only would they
enhance its economic growth and standing in the global economy, they would also
add to its security given its concerns about Afghanistan and about its own
Azeri minority. Most of all, the specter of further nuclearization, a threat
that unites Central Asia, would be lifted to some degree from the area. Until
now, change has consisted in some significant but not breakthrough moves in
economics. It is now up to Iran more than any other actor to take the next big
step forward and move its relations with Central Asia from one of nice words
and atmospherics to genuinely substantive policy proposals. If Iran does take
that bold step, it is almost certain to find a positive response from its
neighbors, to everyone’s benefit and advantage.
Stephen Blank is
a Senior Fellow with the American Foreign Policy Council.
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