By Halil Karaveli
Why the Military May Get the Upper Hand
Turkey has anticipated Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad’s downfall ever since protests first broke out in
Syria in 2011. It has been disappointed at every turn, though, and now it is
not only Assad who is in trouble but Turkey as well. The way in which Ankara
has responded to the violence across its border has upended its own political
balance and re-empowered its military. It has also brought the peace process
that Turkey started with the Kurdish movement to the brink of collapse.
On October 2, the Turkish
parliament voted to allow Turkey to send troops across its southern borders
into Syria to deal with “risks and threats against our national security along
Turkey’s southern land borders.” The decision was widely interpreted as
signaling that Turkey would be going to war with the Islamic State in Iraq and
al-Sham (ISIS), the terrorist group that has overrun much of Iraq and Syria.
Yet the preamble of the troop authorization neglects to mention ISIS and,
instead, refers to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the militant group that
has fought against the Turkish state since 1984. On October 4, Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan defended the authorization by stating that “ISIS
and PKK are the same” and rhetorically asking why the world is not as enraged
about PKK activities as it is about ISIS. In one fell swoop then, he raised
serious doubts about his government’s intentions of taking the necessary steps
to accommodate the Kurds and the PKK as part of ongoing negotiations
Kurds in Turkey and Syria even
believe that Ankara is still offering covert aid to ISIS in its efforts to
cleanse the Kurdish population of Syria from areas adjacent to Turkey’s
borders. Such accusations first arose in 2012, when Rojava -- the Kurdish region
in Syria -- declared autonomy. In response, the Turkish government retorted
that “We are not going to allow any fait accompli in Syria” and then sent
support to Jabhat al-Nusra, an al Qaeda affiliate that attacked the Kurds. And
now, as ISIS has laid siege to the Kurdish town of Kobani, which is held by a
PKK-affiliated party, Turkey has come to face new accusations of complicity for
failing to intervene. Last week, Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the PKK,
warned that the fall of Kobani would end the peace process in Turkey. Cemil
Bayik, the co-leader of the PKK’s civilian arm, said that if Ankara were to
look the other way as Kobani fell, the war would restart in Turkey. He remarked
that a “buffer zone (which Turkey plans to establish) would be targeting us. We
cannot pursue [peace] with a power that crushes what has been achieved in
Rojava.”
So far, at least, Erdogan and
the Kurdish movement are still implicitly allied. Indirect Kurdish support has
been, in many ways, crucial for Erdogan. The relative peace since the PKK
agreed to a unilateral cease fire last year has benefited his regime. And it
mattered that the Kurdish movement remained neutral, with a pro-government
tilt, during the Gezi protests 2013. If the Kurds had also joined in, Erdogan would
have faced a much more difficult challenge.
Kurds in Turkey and Syria even
believe that Ankara is still offering covert aid to ISIS in its efforts to
cleanse the Kurdish population of Syria from areas adjacent to Turkey’s
borders.
Öcalan hopes that accommodating
Erdogan will pay off -- that the Kurds will get what they covet, namely some
form of autonomy for the Kurdish-dominated parts of Turkey and that he himself
will be released from jail. Yet that logic was always flawed. After all, it
makes little sense that Erdogan would be prepared to (or could somehow be
induced to) devolve power to the Kurds while he is otherwise concentrating all
power into his own hands. The Kurdish leaders must know that Diyarbakir, the
Turkish Kurds’ unofficial capital, will not get more democracy while Ankara
gets less; however, they have had no choice but to put their faith in Erdogan.
Erdogan, for his part, has a
continued interest in stringing the Kurds along. But the turmoil in Syria is
forcing both sides’ hands. The Kurds have had to deal with growing anger among
their younger generation, who are incensed at what they see as Turkish
complicity in the assault on Syrian Kurds. That pushes the Kurdish leadership
into a more radical stance. Meanwhile, the growing insecurity on Turkey’s
southern borders is pushing Erdogan to be more attentive to the views and
recommendations of the military.
On August 30 this year, the
Turkish military high command went public with its displeasure with the peace
process. Necdet Özel, the Chief of the General Staff, expressed dissatisfaction
at not having been consulted by the government. He reminded the country that
the military’s red lines -- the unity and the territorial integrity of the
nation -- remain unchanged. He vowed that the armed forces will “act
accordingly” if those red lines were to be crossed. Özel’s thinly-veiled
message to the government was that Kurdish self-rule would not be tolerated.
Before the Turkish parliament
voted to allow troops to intervene in Syria and Iraq, Özel and the army and air
force commanders held a briefing -- the first of its kind in years -- for the
government. The generals requested that the government move quickly to
establish buffer zones at four points in Syria -- one of them including the
Kurdish town of Kobani -- in order to preserve Turkey’s security interests.
They said that this should be done even if the United States disapproves. The
details of the briefing were reported in the main pro-government daily Yeni
Safak, which observed that “The presidency, the military and the government
nowadays speak with one voice.”
The last time the Turkish
military was in a similar position to shape the policies of a civilian
government was during the 1990s, when the war between the PKK and the Turkish
state escalated. It is now set to wield power once more as security threats
mount. The AKP had supposedly domesticated the military by jailing hundreds of
officers and by asserting the authority of the elected government in the
National Security Council, which used to be dominated by army generals. But the
officers were freed earlier this year after the country’s constitutional court
ruled that the officers’ rights had been violated. Perhaps in trying to make
lemonade out of lemons as the military grows stronger, Erdogan has come to see
military support as crucial to help him root out supporters of his erstwhile
ally turned enemy, the U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, within the state
bureaucracy.
And, at any rate, Erdogan is a
rightist, so it is not a terribly big step for him to embrace the generals’
views on the Kurdish issue. Historically, democratically elected rightist
governments have been just as prone as the military to curtail freedoms and
liberties. In this light, the anti-Kurdish alliance of Erdogan and the generals
is but the latest affirmation of the nationalist–conservative identity at the
core of the Turkish republic; civilian rightist governments and the military
alike have subscribed to it.
But the effects of the Syrian
turmoil could also be a catalyst for a political realignment that would put
Turkey on a different, more democratic trajectory. For the Kurds, restarting
hostilities is a dead end: They simply cannot defeat Turkey. The alternative
for the Kurdish movement is thus to explore the possibility of an alliance with
the social democratic Republican People’s Party (CHP). A de facto alliance did
in fact emerge during the vote to authorize the military incursion into Syria
and Iraq. Against the pro-war camp -- which included the AKP and the
anti-Kurdish Nationalist Action Party -- stood an anti-war coalition composed
of the CHP and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP).
The CHP and HDP share a common
social democratic ideology, but they are also divided by nationalism. CHP has
become more consistently social democratic under the leadership of Kemal
Kilicdaroglu, but the party still has a vocal, Turkish nationalist wing that
would not be comfortable with a broad Turkish–Kurdish social democratic
coalition. Still, the strong showing of HDP co-chairman Selahattin Demirtas
during the recent presidential election might change some minds. Although the
pro-Kurdish party does not usually attract more than six percent of the votes
nationwide, Demirtas received nearly ten percent. He did so by highlighting
liberal and leftist themes that resonated with urban liberals and Turkish and
Kurdish social democratic constituencies.
The HDP and CHP are in the
process of exploring the possibility of some form of cooperation in the
upcoming parliamentary elections slated for 2015. For that to happen, though,
both parties would have to undergo significant changes and distance themselves
from their respective nationalist strains That is, in all probability, a long
shot, especially in the case of the CHP. But if Turkish and Kurdish social
democrats were to present a united front, Turkey would get what it has lacked
since the 1970s, a strong social democratic alternative to the dominant,
authoritarian right.
Unfortunately, given Turkey’s
history, it is more likely that growing insecurity and heightened conflict is
going to further entrench authoritarianism.
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